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The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership’s investment chapter: One step 




Negotiations on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) began in May 2013 
“to achieve a modern, comprehensive, high-quality and mutually beneficial economic 
partnership agreement among the ASEAN Member States and ASEAN’s FTA Partners.”1 During 
RCEP’s Summit on November 11, 2019, participating countries, except India, agreed on all 20 
chapters and essentially all their market-access issues, and decided to proceed with “legal 
scrubbing.” RCEP will be signed in 2020.2 
 
RCEP’s economic rationale resides in the scale of the economic area, as its consolidated market is 
large enough to create positive trade-creation effects and to boost more inclusive economic growth 
in this region. In fact, RCEP would create the world’s largest trade bloc, even larger than the 
United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement or the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for 
Trans-Pacific Partnership. RCEP’s regulatory rationale is to address the Asian noodle bowl of 
investment treaties: as of end-2019, RCEP members (excluding India) have concluded 695 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and 281 preferential trade agreements containing investment 
chapters. This means that RCEP countries take part in 28% of all international investment 
agreements (IIAs).  
Malaysia’s trade minister publicly stated that all countries involved had agreed to exclude ISDS 
provisions from RCEP.3 India’s strict position on ISDS and numerous other trade-related issues 
caused a lowest common denominator approach, explained by its own BITs renegotiations. Both 
India and Indonesia were opposed, as matter of principle, to ISDS. Despite India’s decision not to 
join the consensus, the investment chapter should remain untouched, partly because there is still 
hope that India will sign RCEP in 2020. Capital exporting countries (especially the Republic of 
Korea, Japan and Australia) agreed to the exclusion of ISDS. Japan could compromise on ISDS 
(as it did in the ASEAN-Japan FTA which has no investment chapter) as Japanese investors can 
still rely on BITs (containing ISDS) with ASEAN countries. This means that the noodle bowl of 
IIAs remains largely unaddressed. In terms of substantive protections, RCEP resembles a slightly 
enhanced ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA). In particular, RCEP further 
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clarifies—and limits—provisions regarding fair and equitable treatment, denial of benefits and 
performance requirements (which were provisions repeatedly re-assed by ASEAN negotiators in 
the context of the ACIA implementation).    
 
Four main policy lessons can be drawn from the RCEP investment chapter negotiations:  
 
 While India was not part of the RCEP consensus in November 2019, the country has not 
formally withdrawn from the negotiations. Japan recently expressed doubt over whether it 
would sign RCEP without India. Time will tell if this was a tactic to obtain greater 
concessions before signature, or if India will step out of the largest trade bloc in the Asia-
Pacific.  
 
 While many commitments have been made in the text, the final agreement should be 
viewed as a framework rather than the last word on the topic. Like all ASEAN+1 FTAs, 
RCEP will include a built-in agenda (including on preparatory work for implementation 
and capacity development; economic integration; business utilization of RCEP 
opportunities). Moreover, domestic-level implementation will be extremely important.  
Once the negotiations are concluded, the next challenge will be for developing countries 
effectively to translate the broad guidelines, rules and regulations at the RCEP level into 
workable, effective laws, regulations and guidelines within individual member countries.  
 
 Given the structure of many economies, domestic implementation will have to be designed 
with a careful eye toward enhancing the ability of smaller firms to take advantage—through 
adequate competition policy frameworks—of the opportunities created through RCEP. 
 
 The RCEP investment chapter signals another—and major—blow to ISDS in the Asia-
Pacific region, confirming earlier signals sent especially by India, Indonesia, Japan, and 
Australia. RCEP also shows China’s flexibility regarding dispute-settlement arrangements 
or even their absence, despite its increasing outward FDI and the Belt-and-Road Initiative: 
the China-Australia FTA foresees a bilateral court system (not put to use yet), while the 
China-Canada BIT foresees arbitration.   
While RCEP negotiations were launched with great ambitions, the tangible outcome is rather 
disappointing. RCEP’s investment chapter represents two steps backwards. Negotiations are 
concluded, but India has not (yet) joined the consensus. Moreover, RCEP adds just another layer 
to the many existing investment treaties in the region which, given RCEP’s investment chapter 
limitations, remain more important than ever for most RECP investors. No investment claims will 
be made under RCEP; instead, RCEP investors will rely on old BITs to challenge host country 
policies. However, RCEP still constitutes a step forward as it creates an investment framework 
that is tightly linked to trade and that could be refined in the future.  
 
* The Columbia FDI Perspectives are a forum for public debate. The views expressed by the author(s) do not 
reflect the opinions of CCSI or Columbia University or our partners and supporters. Columbia FDI Perspectives 
(ISSN 2158-3579) is a peer-reviewed series. 
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